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A B S T R A C T
Suburban jurisdictions are disproportionately likely to convert their land to land uses that maximize revenue
generation. Yet, the jurisdictions that convert land to more ﬁscally lucrative uses are likely to experience gains in
low-wage retail jobs – possibly contributing to poor upward mobility. This study oﬀers a new perspective on
both the factors behind and eﬀects of the conversion of land use to sales taxable uses, via a unique dataset that
identiﬁes land use changes on 1.2million parcels in California (from tax assessor data) from 2007 to 2013. After
linking to data on compactness, municipal tax structure, and economic characteristics, the study examines ﬁrst
how various urban form and ﬁscal factors shape conversion (controlling for economic and demographic vari-
ables), and then how conversion to more ﬁscally lucrative uses (along with urban form and ﬁscal factors) aﬀect
net job quality, speciﬁcally wages, over time. Not only does ﬁscal structure, particularly municipal dependence
on sales tax revenue, lead to the conversion of land to ﬁscally lucrative uses, controlling for other factors, it also
contributes to wage decline. The more compact the urban fabric, the less likely is land use conversion, yet the
greater the wage decline. The ﬁndings of this study suggest that land use conversion may thwart broader eco-
nomic development goals.
1. Introduction
Urbanization processes continually reshape how land is used. In
metropolitan areas with valuable land in the urban core, property
owners, often with the encouragement of city oﬃcials, may convert
land to a use considered higher and better, i.e., more lucrative. One use
that oﬀers relatively high returns is retail, which generates not just
revenues for business owners, but ﬁscal returns for governments in the
form of sales taxes. Conversion to retail does not occur uniformly across
metros: Suburban jurisdictions often disproportionately depend on sales
tax revenue, suggesting an association between retail land use con-
version and sprawl (Chapple, 2016; Wassmer, 2002). On the other
hand, parcels that convert to commercial use more generally tend to
cluster and be located close to the core (Fragkias & Geoghegan, 2010;
Landis & Zhang, 1998).
Conversion of land use can facilitate the location and expansion of
businesses with high sales tax yields. However, many of these busi-
nesses, particularly in the retail sector, tend to pay relatively low wages.
This begs the question – as urbanization leads to land use changes, are
jurisdictions sacriﬁcing local job quality? The conversion of land to
sales tax-generating uses in particular may have opportunity costs by
crowding out other uses. This may improve job accessibility for re-
sidents in the laborshed, but essentially entraps them in low-wage,
dead-end jobs (Hanson & Pratt, 1995). It may also explain the chal-
lenges sprawling areas experience in fostering the upward mobility of
their residents (Ewing, Hamidi, Grace, & Wei, 2016).
To study these relationships, this study links a unique dataset of the
conversion of land use in California from 2007 to 2013 to data on urban
form (the compactness index from Ewing & Hamidi, 2014), businesses
(from the National Establishment Time Series, or NETS data), and
wages (from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages). Using
multivariate regression, the analysis ﬁrst develops an understanding of
the factors behind land use conversion, particularly municipal depen-
dence on the sales tax. Then, the article turns to the role of ﬁscal
structure and urban form in explaining wage declines at the neigh-
borhood level.
The next section reviews the literature on the conversion of land use
and its connections to ﬁscal motives, sprawl and job quality. After an
overview of methods and data assembled for this study, the article turns
next to a description of the extent and nature of the conversion of land
to ﬁscally lucrative uses in the state of California. The following section
explores and models the relationship between conversion, sprawl, and
job quality. A ﬁnal section concludes by oﬀering policy implications.
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2. Linking the conversion of land use, sprawl, and job quality
2.1. Understanding the conversion of land use
Most studies of the conversion of land have focused on the trans-
formation of agricultural or vacant parcels to residential use, with the
aim of understanding and predicting metropolitan development, par-
ticularly the process of sprawl (e.g., Carrion-Flores & Irwin, 2004; Irwin
& Bockstael, 2007). Research on conversion to commercial use typically
combines commercial oﬃce and retail into a single category, and fo-
cuses on the conversion from vacant to commercial. Several factors
consistently shape conversion: distance to the nearest central business
district, freeway access, population growth, lot size, land costs, adjacent
uses, local density, and land use policies (Fragkias & Geoghegan, 2010;
Landis & Zhang, 1998; Liu, Yue, & Fan, 2011). However, the direction
of the impact varies, even within the same metropolitan area: for in-
stance Landis and Zhang (1998) ﬁnd that job growth and highway
access have a positive eﬀect in some Bay Area counties but negative in
others.
The conversion of land to commercial, or more speciﬁcally, retail
use may be an indicator of the “ﬁscalization of land use,” when local
governments make local land use decisions in order to maximize rev-
enue generation through both the attraction of tax-generating uses and
the reduction of government service costs. Were ﬁscalization rampant,
states might be seeing increases in property and sales tax revenue. Yet,
over time dependence on sales and property tax has actually been de-
clining. The share of local revenues garnered from property tax has
decreased nationally from 25.6% in 1972 to 16.6% in 2005, compen-
sated by increases in personal income tax and fees for services, among
other sources (Rueben & Rosenberg, 2008). More recently, throughout
the US, states are experiencing a slow decline in sales tax revenue per
capita, due in part to a shift in economic activity from the consumption
of goods to services (Coleman, 2015).
Because of Proposition 13′s cap on property tax assessment,
California has experienced much slower growth in property tax rev-
enues than have other states (Gamage, 2009); since its jurisdictions
have had to scramble for new revenues, California oﬀers a unique lens
into land conversion and ﬁscal strategies. Proposition 13′s property tax
limits have shifted the focus of the ﬁscalization strategy from property
to sales tax. Local jurisdictions have little incentive in boosting property
values long-term, because they get so little property tax revenue back
from the state (Wassmer, 2002).
The State of California collects the locally levied sales tax, which
ranges from 7.5 to 10% depending on the city, and returns 1% to the
municipality—the “situs rule”, also known as the Bradley-Burns law.
Thus, for the average California city, sales tax revenue makes up a re-
latively small share (8%) of the total revenues, and just one-fourth of
the tax revenues. The value of the 1% is primarily that it is not dedi-
cated to speciﬁc purposes but can be used at the city’s discretion (Lewis,
2001a).
The dependence on sales tax revenue may impact urbanization
processes. The desire to improve city ﬁnances may lead cities to rezone
land for retail or other taxable uses, to respond more favorably to de-
velopment proposals that will bring in new tax revenues, and/or to dole
out incentives in order to attract ﬁscally remunerative land uses. In
some cases, incentives exacerbate urban sprawl, by subsidizing business
moves from older urban sites to greenﬁelds (LeRoy, Hinkley, &
Tallman, 2000). However, since local retail is a residentiary sector that
is generally not growing, it will likely not impact economic growth at
the aggregate (regional) level, but rather just redistribute retailers
among municipalities (Wassmer, 2002).
That cities embrace the ﬁscalization of land use is common wisdom
among planners, yet there are just two studies that attempt to analyze
it, both focusing on California (Lewis, 2001a; Wassmer, 2002). Neither
study looks at the actual conversion of land, instead measuring ﬁsca-
lization indirectly via either the city intent to attract retail or the
relationship between sales tax revenue and retail activity. The following
sections explore their ﬁndings in more detail, looking speciﬁcally at
how they relate ﬁrst to sprawl and then to job quality.
2.2. The ﬁscalization of land use and sprawl
Municipalities seem to embrace the ﬁscalization of land use. Given a
variety of land use choices, surveyed California city managers say they
prefer retail, followed by oﬃce, mixed use, and light industrial, with
multi-family residential and heavy industrial at the end of the list
(Lewis, 2001a). If local governments follow up on their preferences—a
hypothesis not tested in his study—then they may overzone for retail
and underzone for residential and industrial uses, or target more in-
centives to retail uses (Lewis & Barbour, 1999; Lewis, 2001a).
There has been little scholarly attention paid to the role of urban
form—speciﬁcally, compact development—in ﬁscalization. Yet, there is
likely a close relationship between ﬁscalization and sprawl. For in-
stance, an extensive literature establishes the cost of sprawl (Burchell,
Downs, McCann, & Mukherji, 2005; Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2008;
Frumkin, 2002; Lambert, Srinivasan, & Katirai, 2012). These cost-
s—new infrastructure, extra maintenance and services such as emer-
gency response, environmental impacts, health impacts, fuel costs, and
opportunity costs—likely place stress on municipal ﬁnances, which
then could result in more ﬁscalization of land use.
However, studies do establish that cities and suburbs (a possible
proxy for sprawl) diﬀer. The above-mentioned city manager survey
found that, when asked about their preferences for development, city
managers in suburban municipalities tend to rank retail land use higher
than do those in central cities (Lewis, 2001b). Similarly, reliance on
sales tax revenue has a signiﬁcant and positive inﬂuence on suburban
(non-central-city) retail activity, although urban growth boundaries can
reduce this retail sprawl over time (Wassmer, 2002). Because of their
increase in retail, suburbs gain business taxes and franchise or license
fees as well (ibid.). A more recent study showed that the reliance of
California jurisdictions on sales taxes has remained relatively constant
over the past decade – but is much more concentrated in suburban
neighborhood types: sales taxes comprise 2–5% of the budget in cities
like San Francisco or Los Angeles, but 12–14% in the suburbs (Chapple,
2016).
Thus, in sum, though there is minimal evidence, reliance on sales
tax seems to increase retail activity in the suburbs, quite possibly be-
cause jurisdictions are making land use decisions on a ﬁscal basis.
Suburbs in particular are attracted to the sales tax generation potential
of big box retail and auto malls, and may accommodate demands for
large, highway-accessible lots, often on the urban fringe—i.e., sprawl.
But it should be noted that much of this academic debate over the
development eﬀects of taxation took place from the 1980s through the
early 2000s, and there has been very little research since.
Yet, questions remain. First, recent years have seen both rising in-
come inequality and the mid-2000s subprime crisis (or Great
Recession), which have created ﬁscal stresses on both local govern-
ments and individual households. At a time of declining wages, does the
conversion of local land use to retail contribute to the losses? Second,
research to date has only examined ﬁscalization of land use in city
versus suburb when it may be the compactness (or lack thereof) of the
local urban form itself that is shaping conversion patterns. Thus, this
article contributes an analysis of the relationship between sprawl, land
use conversion, and job quality.
2.3. Linking land use conversion and urban form to job quality
There is little research on the relationship between land use con-
version, urban form, and local labor markets. In general, models of
wage dynamics rarely analyze patterns below the regional level, con-
sidered the geography at which labor markets function. Thus, a rich
literature on the rise of low-wage labor markets (see, for example,
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Appelbaum, Bernhardt, & Murnane, 2003; Katz & Murphy, 1992; and
Osterman, 1999) pays little heed to intra-metropolitan patterns and
suburbs in particular. Analysis of suburban job quality comes mostly
from the literature on suburban poverty, which shows that the rise in
poverty in the suburbs may be related in part to the declining quality of
nearby jobs (Kneebone & Berube, 2013). Although there are new sub-
urban job centers, they tend not to locate near minority communities,
and job accessibility is declining particularly in the suburbs, in part due
to job sprawl (Kneebone & Holmes, 2015; Raphael & Stoll, 2010).
One study that directly addresses the relationship between sprawl
and labor market outcomes – speciﬁcally, upward mobility – is Ewing,
Hamidi, Grace, and Wei (2016), which shows that sprawling areas have
lower rates of upward mobility, due in part to lower job accessibility.
Although the study hypothesizes social capital, racial segregation, and
income segregation to have indirect eﬀects as well, only the income
(speciﬁcally, poverty) segregation does (Ibid.). The study uses a com-
pactness index (Ewing & Hamidi, 2014), a compound measure that
incorporates measures of population, employment, and urban form; this
study adopts that index as well.
3. Methods and data
Conducting this analysis meant building and linking several datasets
at the neighborhood (measured by census tract), city and county levels:
data on land use conversion, urban form, labor market and business
patterns, ﬁscal structure, regional characteristics, and demographic
characteristics. In using the tract as the unit of analysis, this study
diﬀers from conventional studies of the conversion of land use, which
look at parcel-level changes; studies of the ﬁscalization of land use,
which typically use cities; and studies of the labor market, which ty-
pically use metropolitan areas. The tract is thus an intermediate level
that allows us to examine the role of neighborhood context – urban
form (such as compactness), demographics, and business clusters –
while still examining parcel characteristics (aggregated to the tract) and
controlling for city ﬁscal characteristics and regional context. Table 1
describes the variables used.
To analyze land use conversion for California census tracts, I created
a dataset that analyzes land use change between 2007 and 2013 on all
recorded parcels in California, a total of about 1.2 million parcels, re-
presenting about 40% of acreage in the state; for this analysis, I use tax
assessor parcel data from Dataquick, a dataset that includes only par-
celized acreage. In both 2007 and 2013, 99.5% of parcels included the
use code, the ﬁeld used to construct the conversion variable. It is not
possible in this dataset to determine if a parcel has been subdivided, so
the analysis is not able to identify development that occurred on newly
created parcels.
The tax assessor data for each county adopt a use code that iden-
tiﬁes property use, based on data provided by jurisdictions from a
combination of general plan, zoning, and permit ﬁles. Because the data
may be inconsistent between jurisdictions due to the diﬀerent data
collection methods employed, Dataquick standardizes the data; more-
over, there are very little missing data and the dataset is updated yearly.
A recent study that validated Dataquick assessor data from the previous
year in the ﬁeld found that its land use codes were still 71–100% ac-
curate (Chapple et al., 2017). Thus I was able to analyze changes in use
code between 2007 and 2013. Representing conversion of land use to
ﬁscally lucrative uses are parcels which were converted (according to
their use code) from a non-sales-taxable use in 2007 (e.g., residential,
manufacturing, or park space) to a sales-tax-generating use (e.g., stores,
gas stations, restaurants, auto malls, casinos, and so forth). This con-
version may occur either because the parcel has changed use or because
the zoning has changed (or both). Parcels were summarized to the tract
level to create the conversion variable – percent change from 2007 to
2013 in the number of sales-taxable properties. Of the 8057 census
tracts in California, 7063 are included in the database, representing all
26 of California’s metropolitan areas. Other assessor parcel character-
istics summarized to the tract level include the number of properties in
a sales taxable classiﬁcation in 2007, the total assessed value in 2007
(to proxy for land value), and the share of parcels that are either
commercial or vacant (to look at clustering and development potential).
At the tract level, this database was then linked to the tract-level
compactness index (Ewing & Hamidi, 2014). The compactness index is
a compound index (with 0 representing sprawl and 100 and above re-
presenting compactness) that incorporates population and employment
density, job-population balance, job mix, walk score, block size, and
intersection density and conﬁguration. Because it already captures di-
mensions of urban form and job accessibility, it is collinear with many
variables and supplants them in the analysis.
As a proxy for job centers, a variable generally found signiﬁcant in
land use conversion models, the analysis uses a regional job accessi-
bility variable from Salon, Boarnet, and Mokhtarian (2014), which is a
gravity model-based measure (speciﬁcally, the distance-weighted sum
of the number of jobs located between ﬁve and 50 miles of the census
tract). From the U.S. Census, I linked tract-level control variables on the
Table 1
Variables in the analysis.
Variable type Variable Mean Standard deviation
Labor market Change in unemployment rate, metropolitan region, 2007–2013 4% 8%
Average weekly wages in local industry, 2007 (2013$) $ 898 $ 250
Metropolitan employed labor force, 2007 3,245,855 2,525,378
Industry mix Share retail employment 2007 22.0% 13.9%
Share professional services, FIRE, and IT employment 2007 17.2% 11.0%
Share construction and utilities employment 2007 6.6% 6.6%
Share admin and government employment 2007 11.7% 10.2%
Fiscal structure Number of sales-taxable parcels, 2007 33.58 45.63
Total assessed value of property in tract, 2007 $ 481,310,191 $ 504,595,554
Share of sales tax revenue in city budget, 2004 12.6% 8.8%
Total city sales tax revenue, 2004 $ 104,866,593 $ 161,541,745
Urban form Compactness index, 2010 107.23 20.475
Share of tract acreage that is commercial 11% 15%
Share of tract acreage that is vacant 9% 15%
Land use change Percentage change in parcels with sales-taxable use, 2007–2013 41% 346%
Demographic characteristics Share of housing units more than 30 years old, 2000 51.5% 28.1%
Share of persons in poverty, 2000 14.9% 11.5%
Location Regional job accessibility (gravity formula for 5–50 miles) 17.15 12.33
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana MSA (dummy) 41.4% 49.2%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario MSA (dummy) 11.0% 31.3%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont MSA (dummy) 13.1% 33.8%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos MSA (dummy) 8.4% 27.9%
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age of the housing stock and share of the population in poverty. Next
joined to the database was data from the California State Controller’s
Oﬃce on sales tax and total revenues for California cities.
In general, the data came from a year prior to the period under
study (2007–2013), to avoid endogeneity: thus, the regional job ac-
cessibility indicator is from 2003, the tax data from 2004, and the
Census data from 2000. However, the compactness index is only
available for 2010 (though its intersection factor comes from 2007).
Since its major components, such as walkability and block size, are slow
to change, using 2010 data should not impact the analysis in any sig-
niﬁcant way.
To represent business activity, the database draws from the National
Establishment Time- Series database (NETS), a private-sector generated
database that combines Dun & Bradstreet data on individual estab-
lishments into an annual time series from 1990 through 2013; this
study only used establishment and employment data from 2007 and
2013. Calculating wages at the local level – necessary for this study in
order to relate wage changes to neighborhood and city dynamics – was
a multi-step process; although the NETS data provide business data at
the address level, reliable wage data by industry sector are available
only at the county level from another dataset. Studies that analyze local
labor markets often encounter challenges in obtaining data on wages at
the tract or even city level; thus, common practice is to use wages at the
regional labor market level to represent local wage dynamics
(Bendavid-Val, 1991). This is not unreasonable, since employers com-
pete for employees from the regional labor market (represented in this
case by counties) and set wages accordingly. In addition, the avail-
ability of extremely detailed (6-digit NAICS) industry data in the NETS
allows for considerable precision in establishing average wage levels.
Thus, individual business data at the 6-digit NAICS level were linked
to data on average county wages by detailed industry sector from the
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; where data were un-
available (due to conﬁdentiality issues) at the 6-digit level, a higher
level (5-, 4-, or 3-digit NAICS) was substituted. A weighted average
wage per tract (in 2013 dollars) was then calculated based on number
of employees per industry. For example, if a tract had 100 warehouse
workers at an average wage of $15 per hour and 100 retail workers at
an average wage of $10 per hour, tract average wages would be $12.50
per hour. To provide data on industry mix, data on employment by
sector were aggregated to the tract level. Finally, to proxy for regional
labor market strength, as well as the eﬀects of the Great Recession
(which pushed wage levels down) the data were linked to California
Employment Development Department employed worker totals and
unemployment rates by metropolitan area, a standard proxy for the
laborshed.
The ﬁnal dataset includes over 7000 census tracts, but missing
variables mean that the regressions generally include 4000 to 6000
records each. Still, the relatively large size of this sample may result in
highly signiﬁcant ﬁndings where in reality the eﬀect size, or the mag-
nitude of the diﬀerence between groups, is quite minimal (Sullivan &
Feinn, 2012). To test for this possibility, I ran regressions on multiple
random samples with 25% of the records. These tests conﬁrmed the
overall regression eﬀects in two-thirds of the tests. In the other one-
third of the random samples, variables were insigniﬁcant, likely be-
cause the sample was drawn disproportionately from regions where the
phenomena of interest (conversion of land, municipal reliance on sales
tax revenue, and/or wage declines) were less pronounced. Ultimately,
to take advantage of the richer data while still representing the di-
versity of California’s regions (as is typical in California studies such as
those by Kahn, 2007; Salon, 2016), the analysis employs all census
tracts with complete data, along with dummies representing regional
location (based on OMB deﬁnitions for metropolitan area).
The constructed dataset facilitates the exploration of how ﬁscal
considerations and urban form shape both the conversion of land use
and changes in wages, controlling for factors such as location, demo-
graphics, labor market characteristics, and industry mix (Fig. 1).
Speciﬁcally, this study asks (1) how do urban form and ﬁscal variables
contribute to the conversion of land use to sales-taxable uses, control-
ling for other factors? It then builds on that analysis, using the same
variables to ask (2) what is the role of ﬁscal, urban form, and land use
conversion variables in local wage changes? If we can identify factors
associated with land use conversion, as well as a relationship between
conversion, ﬁscal, and other variables and wage decline, this then
suggests that local jurisdictions can act to stem wage declines through
land use policies.
4. Understanding the relationships
4.1. Overview: Conversion of land use and wage changes
Overall, from 2007 to 2013, California saw the conversion of at least
115,000 acres of land to sales-taxable uses (the total could be higher
due to missing data). To illustrate this, Fig. 2 shows the conversion of
land from non-sales-taxable to sales-taxable uses in the Los Angeles
region, which has occurred mostly outside the city of Los Angeles.
Jurisdictions depend on a variety of tax revenues to balance their
budgets, and the extent of their reliance on sales tax revenue varies.
This then aﬀects the conversion of land. To examine this relationship, I
construct a typology describing whether tracts lie within municipalities
that are relatively dependent on property tax, sales tax, or both (Fig. 3).
(A municipality is considered dependent on a revenue stream if it
provides an above-median share of its revenue, relative to other mu-
nicipalities in the state.) Indeed, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
likelihood of parcel conversion depending on the tax context in the
jurisdiction. Conversion from non-taxable to taxable uses is by far most
likely in areas with high reliance on property and sales tax, a situation
that may create a climate of ﬁscalization (p= .000) (Fig. 3). This tax
reliance is overwhelmingly concentrated in suburban areas; for in-
stance, among the top tracts for conversion are Rancho Cucamonga in
San Bernardino County, Hercules in Contra Costa County, and Napa in
Napa County. Older urban areas that have been redeveloped appear as
well, such as the area around the Staples Center in Los Angeles.
The other dependent variable of interest is wage change. Although
the average change in weekly wages in a census tract (in constant 2013
dollars) was an increase of two dollars, tracts across the state experi-
enced wide variation. Experiencing wage losses of over $1000 per week
were tracts in San Francisco, La Brea, and Redwood City, all in neigh-
borhoods undergoing a transformation to a low-wage service economy.
These places were all characterized by the loss of high-end professional
service and information technology jobs, replaced largely by jobs in
health, government, and education, and to a lesser extent retail. Wage
gains of over $1000 were also concentrated in high-cost metros like San
Francisco and Los Angeles, e.g., in neighborhoods adjacent to
Hollywood (such as Burbank) and Silicon Valley (such as Menlo Park,
Fig. 1. Conceptualizing the relationships.
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where Facebook is located). These neighborhoods generally experi-
enced deep losses in retail, education, and health employment and
gains in professional service and information technology jobs.
Looking at correlations helps to clarify the relationships among the
variables, particularly conversion of land use, sales tax dependence,
change in wages, and compactness. There is no signiﬁcant relationship
between conversion and wage change (r=−0.16, p= .18), between
sales tax dependence and wage change (r=−0.023, p= .474), or
between compactness and wage change (r=0.005, p= .656).
However, conversion is negatively correlated with compactness
(r=−0.099, p= .000) and positively correlated with sales tax de-
pendence (r=0.036, p= .016).
4.2. Understanding conversion of land use
The analysis ﬁrst examines the role of factors – labor market, urban
form, tax structure, location, and demographics – in explaining con-
version of land use to sales-taxable uses (Table 2). As is the convention
with land use conversion models, this analysis uses binary logistic re-
gression; speciﬁcally, the model predicts census tracts with an above-
median share of converted parcels. The model is highly signiﬁcant,
predicting 85.9% of the cases, with a pseudo R2 of 0.268.
In predicting the conversion of land use to sales-taxable use, a
variety of factors associated with urban form and ﬁscal structure
matter, controlling for other factors. The factor with the greatest impact
on conversion is local dependence on sales tax revenue: a one percent
increase in share of sales tax revenue in the city budget makes it more
than four times as likely that a parcel will be converted to a sales-tax-
able use. Other ﬁscal structure variables that lead to more conversion
are the total amount of sales tax revenue in the city budget and the total
assessed value in the neighborhood; however, if there are already a
large number of sales-taxable parcels in the neighborhood, the odds of
conversion decrease. The urban form variable also has a signiﬁcant
impact on conversion: the more compact the neighborhood, the less
likely it is to experience land use conversion. A large regional economy
(as measured by employment) is more likely to experience conversion,
but the other labor market control factors make it less likely. Not sur-
prisingly, a strong economy, as evidenced by high local wages and high
job accessibility, make conversion to sales-taxable uses less likely.
However, an increase in regional unemployment also makes conversion
less likely. Regional location matters as well, with conversion more
likely in the Los Angeles-Orange County and Riverside-San Bernardino-
Fig. 2. Share of non-sales-taxable acreage converted to sales-taxable acreage, Los Angeles region, 2007–2013. Source: Author’s calculation.
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Fig. 3. Share of properties converted in census tract, by tax dependency type. Source:
Author’s calculation.
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Ontario metropolitan areas, but less likely in San Diego county.
4.3. Understanding wage changes
To focus further on the role of the conversion of land use in wage
changes, the analysis next looks at change in average weekly wages
from 2007 to 2013 at the census tract level as a function of various
factors. Speciﬁcally, since the wage data are continuous and normally
distributed, with a linear relationship to the conversion variable, this
analysis uses ordinary least squares regression. The analysis ﬁrst sta-
tistically tests the signiﬁcance of traditional labor market indicators,
such as regional economic strength, local industry structure, and initial
wage levels, in predicting wages, and then adds variables accounting
for ﬁscal structure and urban form (prior to the wage changes). Each
model also tests the signiﬁcance of land use conversion in wage
changes. If localities depend on the sales tax, or if certain types of urban
form are associated with business that pay low wages, such as retail, we
might expect to see declines in average wages. Because collinearity
diagnostics revealed some issues with sectoral, locational, urban form,
and tax variables, not all were included in the analysis.
Table 3 shows the modeling results for the four models, which are
highly signiﬁcant, although the low adjusted R2 suggests that these
variables do not by themselves explain wage loss; it is likely instead that
factors internal to the ﬁrm such as liquidity or mergers and acquisitions
play a critical explanatory role. Moreover, the high signiﬁcance levels
may reﬂect the large sample size used in the regressions. Model 1 ex-
amines the role of regional and local labor market dynamics, the tra-
ditional explanatory factors behind wage levels, ﬁnding expected re-
sults, with an adjusted R2 of 0.252. Having a larger regional labor
market in the base year results in wage increases, while starting with
higher wages results in wage declines, all else equal. Not surprisingly,
the strength of the metropolitan economy and shifts in industry struc-
ture shape wage changes: growth in unemployment is associated with
wage declines, as is an increasing share of retail and administrative/
government employment. Regional dummies also matter, with location
in the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario MSA resulting in wage de-
clines. Most importantly, conversion of land to ﬁscally lucrative uses is
signiﬁcant and negatively related to wages.
Model 2 complicates the analysis by adding the compactness index,
which is also signiﬁcantly and negatively related to wages, as well as a
control for local conditions, the share of neighborhood residents in
poverty, which has a similar negative and signiﬁcant impact on wages.
Model 3 focuses instead on ﬁscal structure variables, ﬁnding a sig-
niﬁcant role for local ﬁscal structure in wage declines; not only does the
dependence on sales tax lead to wage declines, but so does the number
of parcels already with sales-taxable uses in 2007. However, the higher
the local assessed value – a proxy for land prices – the greater the wage
increases. (Due to collinearity issues, this and subsequent models re-
move several other variables, resulting in lower explanatory power.)
Model 4 then combines a key measure of ﬁscal structure, the share
of sales tax revenue in the city budget, with the compactness index.
Both compactness and dependence on sales tax revenue are signiﬁcant
and negative predictors of wage change: the more compact the tract, or
the more its host city depends on sales tax, the greater the wage loss,
even controlling for regional economic factors. Moreover, throughout
the models, land use conversion remains a signiﬁcant predictor of wage
decline.
5. Discussion
Recent years have seen a signiﬁcant amount of land in California
converted to ﬁscally lucrative uses. This is often occurring in more
suburban areas, particularly those with a high degree of dependence on
sales and property tax for operating revenue. Might this conversion of
land also account for declining wages? This analysis ﬁrst examined the
factors predicting land use conversion, ﬁnding that ﬁscal considera-
tions, as well as a less compact urban form, are signiﬁcantly associated
with conversion to ﬁscally lucrative uses. It then addressed whether this
conversion has also led to wage changes, conﬁrming that sales tax de-
pendence and land use conversion signiﬁcantly predict the decline of
wages.
Economists typically explain wage changes based on a set of labor
market characteristics. Most readily measured are the mix of local in-
dustries and the tightness of the local labor market, although institu-
tional factors clearly have an impact as well (Osterman, 1999). Not
surprisingly, then, this analysis showed that these labor market vari-
ables matter in predicting wage dynamics. Yet, land conversion and
dependence on local sales tax also predict wage declines. This suggests
that local jurisdictions, which presumably are encouraging the con-
version of land, may be trading oﬀ higher tax revenues for lower wages.
It also suggests that locals may have some power to shape wage out-
comes, should they choose to do so, by restricting or directing the
conversion of land. Of course, it is not possible to know what would
happen in the absence of conversion; the opportunity costs may be
Table 2
Explaining tract-level conversion of land use, 2007–13.
Type Variable Coeﬃcient Odds ratio
Labor market Average weekly wages in local industry, 2007 (2013$) −0.001** 0.999
Change in metropolitan unemployment rate, 2007–2013 −0.556*** 0.574
Metropolitan employed workers, 2007 0.000** 1.000
Location Regional job accessibility (gravity measure, jobs 5–50 miles away) −0.025** 0.975
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario MSA (dummy) 0.516** 1.675
Los Angeles-Orange County MSA (dummy) 1.582* 4.864
San Diego MSA (dummy) −1.564*** 0.209
Demographics Share of housing units more than 30 years old, 2000 −1.446*** 0.236
Urban form Compactness index, 2010 −0.008** 0.992
Share of tract acreage that is commercial 0.206 1.228
Share of tract acreage that is vacant −0.195 0.823
Fiscal structure Share of sales tax revenue in city budget, 2004 2.147*** 8.560
Total city sales tax revenue, 2004 0.000*** 1.000
Number of sales-taxable parcels, 2007 −0.027*** 0.973
Total assessed value of property in tract, 2007 0.000*** 1.000
Constant 3.346*** 28.377
N=3879, % correctly predicted 85.9%.
Pseudo R-square= 0.268, χ2= 0.000, −2 log likelihood=2592.76.
*** p= .000.
** p < .05.
* p < .10.
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negligible or zero if the land would have remained vacant or residential
without conversion.
Compactness, measured at the tract level, leads to wage declines,
controlling for labor market dynamics. This ﬁnding both conﬁrms and
contradicts earlier work predicting upward mobility by Ewing, Hamidi,
Grace, and Wei (2016), which found a positive eﬀect of compactness
and a negative eﬀect of income segregation. Although further research
is warranted, one likely explanation is that this study deploys the
compactness index at the tract level, while Ewing et al. use the me-
tropolitan version. For metropolitan regions, it is well established that
compactness enhances economic performance (productivity and wages)
via agglomeration economies (Cervero, 2001). But at a neighborhood
level, compact urban form may not have the same payoﬀs. Research on
industrial districts and economic growth has long suggested that suc-
cessful districts such as Silicon Valley or the Third Italy function at a
regional scale (see, for instance, Saxenian, 1996).
The logistic regression identiﬁed some signiﬁcant factors that shape
the conversion of land use to sales-taxable uses. Controlling for labor
market dynamics, ﬁscal factors play an important role; in particular, the
higher the dependence on sales tax revenues, the larger the total sales
tax revenues, and the higher the assessed value of local properties, the
more conversion.
Not surprisingly, the regional economy – both the change in un-
employment rate and the region a jurisdiction is located in – matters.
That increases in unemployment regionally decrease the amount of
conversion locally suggests several potential explanations. Given a poor
regional economic outlook, there may be little potential to attract new
sales tax base through retail; intra-city competition for retail won’t
work if high unemployment means lower consumer spending and
businesses are not interested. Additionally, municipalities may be fo-
cusing on job creation rather than tax revenue.
Most interestingly, the more compact the development patterns, the
less conversion occurs, controlling for other factors. These relationships
are complex and warrant further research. But this ﬁnding does suggest
the possibility that more compact development patterns yield beneﬁts
that reduce the need to chase sales tax base. For example, there could
be ﬁscal beneﬁts to compact development that help dissuade jurisdic-
tions from converting their land to ﬁscally lucrative uses. Future re-
search should investigate the potential connection between compact
development patterns and ﬁscal stability.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
The recent growth in low-wage jobs (and wage inequality more
generally) raises questions about what kinds of actions cities can take to
help stem wage decline. Certainly local living wage ordinances oﬀer
promise to improve wage and labor conditions (Lester, 2012). Yet, this
study suggests that local ﬁscal considerations are another factor behind
wage declines. Thus, might restricting conversion – or at least not in-
centivizing it – be an alternative approach?
Although this analysis identiﬁes ﬁscal factors that are behind the
conversion of land use, it is not possible with this dataset to determine
how the conversion actually transpires: is it through variances granted
to property owners, rezoning by the municipality, or simply a change of
uses? Thus, further research would be necessary to determine what
policy changes could slow the pace of conversion.
However, the jurisdictions where conversion is occurring tend to be
those with relatively high sales tax revenue. Thus, the most direct way
to reduce the pressures that lead to conversion would be through
changing how state and local revenue is distributed. As long as local
jurisdictions receive some portion of sales tax back from the state, they
will have the motivation to pursue ﬁscally lucrative uses. One solution
that has been suggested – particularly relevant to states like California
with property tax limits – is to return more property tax to localities,
rather than sales tax (Lewis, 2001a). Compared to the ﬁscalization of
land use via the sales tax, which favors retail land uses, this kind of
ﬁscalization may lead to development that is more balanced between
commercial and residential uses (Barbour, 2007; Lewis, 2001a). The
most eﬀective way to get more property tax revenue back into local
hands is probably through a swap for sales tax revenue; however, at-
tempts to enact such a swap have historically fallen short (Barbour,
2007; Coleman, 2000).
Jurisdictions may trade oﬀ higher sales tax revenues for lower
wages because of the direct beneﬁt; the labor market is regional, so
there is little incentive to pursue high-wage industries. This suggests
that the most eﬀective strategies to curtail the ﬁscalization of land use
will be regional as well. The idea of regional tax base sharing to even
out ﬁscal disparities dates back to the Minneapolis-St. Paul region in the
1970s, though it has proven challenging to adopt elsewhere (Orﬁeld,
2002). Yet, by equalizing the tax share at the county level, it might be
possible to lessen the ﬁscalization incentive. The county might redis-
tribute sales tax revenues to local governments on a per capita basis, a
policy that would incentivize residential growth (Lewis & Barbour,
1999). Optimally, this would be enacted in conjunction with reforms
that return more property tax to localities, so that governments would
still have an incentive to pursue development. Another promising
proposal would reallocate property tax through regional allocation
boards, a solution that would avoid the inequities of relying exclusively
on local governments, while allowing responsiveness to local needs
(Gervais & Rayford, 2012). These might be designated based upon
electoral district boundaries (such as the state senate districts), with a
mix of appointed and elected oﬃcials, with voting power allocated to
be representative of the population (ibid.).
The more compact the urban form, the less land conversion seems to
be taking place. At the same time, compact urban form seems to lead to
wage declines. More research is needed to clarify these relationships. It
may be necessary to decompose the compound compactness index into
its component variables in order to pinpoint the factors behind each of
these dynamics. Likewise, the construction of the land conversion
variable here has limitations. For example, it spans a period from 2007
to 2013 when municipalities were under great ﬁscal stress as they re-
covered from the Great Recession. It measures change in parcels, not
acreage, so conversion may actually be much more extensive in tracts
with large lots than in those with many small parcels.
The conversion – and thence ﬁscalization – of land use occurs not
just through land use and permitting decisions, but also via incentives.
Jurisdictions have very few tools that will aﬀect regional growth, but
location incentives are notoriously ineﬃcient (Markusen, 2007). In
response, some states have enacted reforms that slow the giveaways.
Most involve either increased transparency (for instance, analysis of
costs and beneﬁts), new standards (especially for wages), or clawbacks
(contractual restrictions that allow governments to recover funds from
the ﬁrm if they don’t meet agreed-upon standards for jobs and earnings)
(LeRoy, 2007). But incentives are unlikely to improve wages unless the
regional economy is strong. Ultimately, as this paper makes clear, land
use and tax policy are but one tool to address declining wages.
Previous studies of the ﬁscalization of land use have focused either
on the motives of local oﬃcials, or the change in retail activity. This
study is the ﬁrst to examine how much land has actually been converted
to sales-taxable uses. Future studies should attempt to determine the
relationships between the intentions of local government, the conver-
sion of land, and the retail activity that results. Ultimately, these
questions may entail a more qualitative research approach, in order to
identify the motives of diverse stakeholders, from local government, to
property owners, to developers, to businesses and residents.
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